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Abstract
Whether competition helps or hinders small firms’ access to finance is in itself a
much debated question in the economic literature and in policy circles, especially in
the developing world. Economic theory offers conflicting predictions and empirical
contributions provide mixed results. This paper considers the consequences of inter-
bank competition on credit constraints using firm level data covering 70 developing
and emerging countries. In addition to the classical concentration measures, compe-
tition is assessed by computing three non-structural measures (Lerner index, Boone
indicator, and H-statistics). The results show that bank competition alleviates cre-
dit constraints, while bank concentration measures are not robust predictors of a
firm’s access to finance. Findings highlight that bank competition not only leads
to less severe loan approval decisions but also reduces borrowers’ discouragement.
In addition, a secondary result of this paper documents that banking competition
enhances credit availability more by reducing prices than by increasing relationship
lending.
Mots cle´s / Key words : Bank competition, access to credit, developing countries,
discouraged borrower
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Acknowledgement / Remerciements : We are grateful to Pierrick Baraton,
Vianney Dequiedt, Samuel Gue´rineau, Lars Norden and Alexandre Sauquet, as well
as participants at the 3rd CInSt Banking Workshop (Moscow, November 2013) and
ADRES Doctoral conference (Paris, February 2014) for useful comments.
3
Etudes et Documents no 13, CERDI , 2014
1 Introduction
Limited access to bank credit is viewed by many policy makers and academics as a major
growth constraint for developing economies, in particular for small- and medium-sized
enterprises (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Ayyagari et al., 2008). As a result, many re-
sources have been devoted to improving credit availability around the world. Meanwhile,
banking industry structures in developing countries have undergone major transforma-
tions. Competition in the banking sector may be an important driver of access to credit.
The impact of competition on credit availability is then a crucial policy and academic
question. Economic theory makes conflicting predictions. The traditional market power
view argues that market power is detrimental in banking as well as in other industries. As
a result, fiercer competition leads to lower costs and better access to finance (Besanko and
Thakor, 1992; Guzman, 2000). In the presence of information asymmetries and agency
costs, however, competition can reduce access by depriving banks of the incentive to build
lending relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). 1 Other contributions document that the
quality of screening (Broecker, 1990; Marquez, 2002) and banks’ incentives to invest in
information acquisition technologies (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) are higher in less
competitive markets. Therefore, the information hypothesis argues that access to credit
for opaque borrowers can be reduced when competition is harsher.
Which of these views best describes the implications of competition in terms of access to
credit is ultimately an empirical issue. Despite the policy relevance of this issue, empirical
evidence on the effect of interbank competition on access to finance in developing countries
is scarce and largely inconclusive. Using data from 74 developed and developing countries,
Beck et al. (2004) show that bank concentration increases the probability that firms report
finance as a major obstacle to growth, in line with the market power view. Chong et al.
(2013) give support for the market power view in China. Gonza´lez and Gonza´lez (2008),
however, document that firms use more external funds in countries with less competitive
markets, in line with the information hypothesis. 2 A major concern with these studies
1. Boot and Thakor (2000), however, document that the role exerted by competition on bank rela-
tionships is somewhat inconclusive.
2. The implication of concentration on economic or industrial growth is also inconclusive. Cetorelli
and Gambera (2001) give some support for the information hypothesis. Deidda and Fattouh (2005) give
4
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refers to the proxy of competition used. The degree of competition is assessed by market
concentration. Several contributions have cast doubt on the consistency and robustness
of the structural approach as an indicator of competition in banking. Both the theory of
contestability (Baumol et al., 1983) and the theory of efficient-structure (Demsetz, 1973)
argue that market structure is a weak proxy of market power. Furthermore, concentration
may proxy for a whole range of conduct-determining bank and market characteristics,
including average bank size and bank complexity in terms of product variety and activity
for instance (Ergungor, 2004). Carbo´-Valverde et al. (2009b) document that this issue is
not only a technical problem insofar as conclusions may be sensitive to the measure of
competition employed.
A recent wave of works has tried to overcome this issue by employing non-structural
measures of competition. For instance, Claessens and Laeven (2005) examine the influence
of banking competition on economic growth in 16 countries, using the Panzar-Rosse H-
statistic as a non-structural approach to indicate market competition. They find that
sectors heavily dependent on bank financing grow faster in countries where there is fierce
bank competition. Liu and Mirzaei (2013) confirm the market power view by employing
the sensitivity of market share to relative costs, an indicator of competition initially
proposed by Hay and Liu (1997) and extended by Boone (2008). Ferna´ndez de Guevara
and Maudos (2011) find opposite evidence that the exercise of market power enhances
economic growth, supporting the information hypothesis. They measure competition by
employing both the Lerner index and the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic. Hoxha (2013) reaches
similar conclusions using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic. Recent papers directly investigate
the relationship between the use of credit and bank competition. Using a panel data
analysis on 53 developing countries and the Lerner index as proxy for competition, Love
and Martinez Peria (2012) show that the use of bank loan is lower in more competitive
markets, giving support for the market power view. However, in a sample of 33 countries,
Mudd (2013) obtains a more complex relationship between interbank competition and
a firm’s probability of having a line of credit. Competition (measured by Panzar-Rosse
H-statistics) has a positive but declining effect on a firm’s use of bank financing, turning
support for the market power hypothesis for low-income countries, while Ferna´ndez et al. (2010) show
that concentration is not detrimental for growth in countries with weak institutions.
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to a negative impact for competitive markets above the mean level.
This paper tests the information hypothesis versus the market power hypothesis in the
context of developing countries but also mechanisms by which competition affects credit
availability. Econometric analysis considers almost 30,000 firms from 70 developing coun-
tries across four continents. Firm-level variables are extracted from World Bank Enter-
prises Surveys (WBESs) and country-level variables are taken from diverse sources. Using
survey responses, firms are divided into four groups according to their credit market expe-
rience. The ”Non-Borrowers” group assembles firms that did not need credit the previous
year. ”Discouraged Borrowers” gathers together firms that needed a loan but did not ap-
ply. Among the applicants, I distinguish between ”Denied Borrowers” who did not receive
a loan and ”Accepted Borrowers” who did. A firm is declared as financially constrained if
it is classified in the ”Discouraged Borrowers” or ”Denied Borrowers” group. This strategy
of distinguishing and grouping firms that were turned down and those discouraged from
applying has already been employed by Popov and Udell (2012). Information on bank
competition is extracted from the Global Financial Development Database. Competition
in the banking industry is assessed by the traditional concentration ratio (the share of as-
sets held by the three largest banks) and three non-structural measures (the Lerner index,
Boone indicator, and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic). The effect of bank competition on credit
availability is obtained by running a random-effect probit model including a competition
measure and controlling for firm- and country-level characteristics. The empirical set-up
allows us not only to study the determinants of credit rationing but also the determinants
of a firm’s decision to apply for a credit and a bank’s decision to approve or reject the
request. This stage enables us to understand how competition impacts the behaviors of
credit market participants. To control for sample selection, a probit with sample selection
model is used at this stage.
The results show that financing constraints are alleviated in countries where banking
markets are more competitive, irrespective of whether competition is measured by the
Boone indicator or the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, supporting the market power hypothe-
sis. Employing the Lerner index to proxy market power suggests a similar conclusion,
while the results are not robust. The degree of concentration has no impact on credit
availability. In the second step of the analysis, we investigate the differential impact of
6
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competition on borrowers and lenders. In more competitive markets, firms are less re-
luctant to apply and the probability of applicants receiving funds is higher. The results
show that competition not only leads to less severe loan approval decisions but that is also
reduces borrower discouragement. An additional result of this paper documents that ban-
king competition enhances credit availability more by reducing prices than by increasing
relationship lending.
This paper makes important contributions to the literature on the relationship between
bank competition and credit availability in developing countries by addressing a number
of issues that have not yet been resolved. First, to our knowledge, this paper is the first
that considers different non-structural measures of competition to investigate the im-
plications of competition on credit availability. Non-structural measures of competition
are more relevant than structural measures to proxy competition. However, there is no
consensus regarding the best measure by which to gauge competition. The choice of a
particular indicator can influence conclusions regarding the implications of competition
(Carbo´-Valverde et al., 2009b). By confronting the findings from several non-structural
measures, this paper gives a more complete picture of the role of competition on credit
availability. In particular, it is the first work to use the Boone indicator to document the
linkage between competition and access to credit. Second, the identification of financially
constrained firms remains a challenge. Existing studies measure credit constraints by a
firm’s perception of finance as an obstacle to growth (Beck et al., 2004; Clarke et al.,
2006) or the mix of internal and external funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Gonza´lez and
Gonza´lez, 2008; Carbo´-Valverde et al., 2009b). The survey measures are subject to per-
ception bias (Ergungor, 2004) and the mix of funds requires data on firms’ balance sheets,
rarely available for SMEs in developing countries. Recent works proxy credit constraints
by the use of credit (Love and Martinez Peria, 2012; Mudd, 2013). The fact that few
firms obtain credit is, however, not sufficient to prove constraints, since certain firms
may not have a demand for credit. This hypothesis is far from anecdotal in developing
countries, more than half of firms had no demand for credit (Cole and Dietrich, 2012). A
comprehensive definition of credit constraints should measure the demand for credit that
is unfulfilled by the existing supply of credit due to market imperfections (Chong et al.,
2013). As a result, we classify a firm as constrained if its demand is not fulfilled by the
7
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supply of funds due to market frictions. This includes not only firms whose application
was turned down, but also firms who refused to apply in spite of a viable project. Third,
this work not only tests the market power hypothesis vs. the information hypothesis but
also tries to understand how competition exerts a differential impact on borrowers and
on banks decisions. In addition, we also try to identify the channel by which competition
affects credit availability (price channel vs. relationship channel). The final contribution
involves to country coverage. The sample considers 70 developing countries including
many countries from Africa and other low-income countries.
In addition to its contributions to the literature regarding the impact of bank competition
on credit availability in developing countries, this work also adds to the empirical litera-
ture on borrower discouragement and approval/denial decisions in developing countries.
Empirical studies are generally focused on the U.S. (Cole, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002;
Han et al., 2009; Cole, 2010). Recent contributions have begun to investigate these issues
in the case of developing countries (Bigsten et al., 2003; Cole and Dietrich, 2012; Brown
et al., 2011; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013) but often analyze the characteristics of firms
or managers to explain a firm’s discouragement or a bank’s rejection decision. Brown
et al. (2011) underline that country characteristics play a significant role in borrower dis-
couragement and in bank decisions to deny in Eastern Europe. Cole and Dietrich (2012)
confirm the importance of macroeconomic factors to explain discouragement and denial
in the case of 80 developing countries. Taking advantage of the large country coverage, we
investigate a large set of country characteristics, including interbank competition. The
findings shed light on the important role played by country characteristics to explain
borrower discouragement and bank decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
describes the empirical methodology. The baseline results are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 presents key robustness checks and the final section concludes.
2 Data
The database used in this paper combines firm- and country-level data from various
sources. The firm-level data come from the World Bank Enterprises Surveys (WBES).
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The dataset is supplemented with country-level data from diverse sources such as the
World Development Indicators, the Global Financial Development Database, and the
Doing Business databases. Some filtering rules are applied. Firms for which information
about credit market experience was not available and for whom at least one of the firm-
and country-level control variables were not available have been dropped. We then ex-
cluded observations when the interviewer did not believe that the responses were reliable
(question a16). Finally, firms with more than 5,000 employees that can access equity mar-
kets have been excluded. The final sample includes 28,952 firms from 70 low-income and
middle income countries spanning four continents (Africa, Latin America, Europe and
Asia). Two fifths of the firms were surveyed in 2006 and one third in 2009. Others were
surveyed in 2007, 2008 and 2011. The sample considered has the advantage of grouping
together economies with heterogenous characteristics.
2.1 Measuring credit constraints
The survey data collected include quantitative as well as qualitative information. Among
other topics, surveys address questions about access to finance. To identify credit constrai-
ned firms, we refer to a number of questions regarding the credit experience of the firm
in the year previous to the survey. The methodology employed follows previous contri-
butions (Brown et al., 2011; Cole and Dietrich, 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012). The first
question is whether or not the firm applied for a loan (k.16 : In last year, did this esta-
blishment apply for loans or lines of credit ? ). In order to distinguish between discouraged
borrowers and non-borrowers among non-applicants, we turned to the subsequent ques-
tion (question k.17) which asks the main reason for not applying. Firms are considered
as ”Non-Borrowers” if they declared that they did not apply because they did not need a
loan. Among the applicants (firms that answered ”yes” in question k16), a distinction is
made between approved and denied applicants. A firm is declared as approved if at least
one request was not turned down. The question k.18 gives the number of applications
submitted and the question k.19 the number of applications rejected. A firm is coded as
”Approved Borrowers” if the number of applications is larger than the number of applica-
tions rejected (and 0 if all applications were rejected). For several countries, we did not
9
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have this information. In such case, we used the question k18a : ”Did the firm apply for
any new loans/lines of credit that were rejected in last fiscal year ?”. 3
From this classification, we divided firms among financially constrained firms and others.
A firm is declared as rationed if it is classified as ”Discouraged Borrower” or ”Denied
Borrower”. This measure allows us to identify firms expressing a demand for formal funds
that was not fulfilled by supply. Contrary to measures based on firms’ use of formal
loans (Love and Martinez Peria, 2012; Mudd, 2013), we are able to discriminate between
constrained firms and firms that have expressed no demand for loans. According to the
definition proposed, one third of firms are rationed (Table 8). Sixty-three percent of
firms reported a need for external funds but only 58% of these firms applied. Among the
applicants, a large number obtained at least one loan (85%). As documented in Table 1,
the credit market experiences differ greatly across developing countries. More than 3 out
of 4 firms are rationed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Ivory Coast, Mali
or Mozambique, but this ratio is below 10% in Hungary and Slovenia.
2.2 Measuring bank competition
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the implications of bank competition on credit
availability. 4 The choice of the appropriate proxy for interbank competition is there-
fore crucial. All measures of bank competition are based on bank-level information. The
Bankscope database, which covers a large range of banks in the world, is employed to
extract balance sheet and income statement information on banks. Computations of indi-
cators of competition are made by World Bank staff and reported in the Global Financial
Development Database.
Despite some limitations with the structural approach, the share of assets held by the three
largest banks is used as a proxy of the impact of market concentration. We complement
the information on bank structure that imperfectly captures bank conduct by using three
indicators of competition based on the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO)
3. It should be noted that surveys do not capture the reason for the refusal. I then assume that all
applicants had a rate of return at least equal to the market cost of capital.
4. For a review of advantages and drawbacks of various measures of competition in the banking
industry, see Le´on (2014).
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approach : the Lerner index, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, and the Boone indicator. These
different measures do not provide the same information about competition, and thus catch
different aspects of competition.
The Lerner index is often used in empirical works. It captures the extent to which banks
can maintain a price level above their own marginal costs. Greater values of the Lerner
index are associated with greater levels of market power. For each individual bank, average
revenues proxy price and marginal costs are obtained from the estimation of cost function
with three inputs : labor, physical capital and deposits (more details can be found in Love
and Martinez Peria, 2012). The Lerner index for country c is the weighted (by bank size)
average of individual Lerner indices of all banks in country c. The Lerner index is not a
measure of competition but an indicator of market power. Boone et al. (2013) show that
the Lerner index at the country level consistently has problems picking up increasing
competition due to more aggressive conduct of incumbent firms. The Lerner index is
sensitive to the reallocation of activity from inefficient to efficient firms when competition
intensifies. This concern is particularly relevant in concentrated markets that encompass
the banking industry in many developing countries as documented in Table 1 (Boone et al.,
2013). Furthermore, price cost margins are sensitive to the degree of efficiency (Koetter
et al., 2012) and risk (Oliver et al., 2006), and therefore macroeconomic conditions (Carbo´-
Valverde et al., 2009a). As a consequence, the Lerner index, widely-used in the literature,
may be not the most relevant measure of competition. In addition, the Lerner index is
available for only 51 countries.
The Panzar-Rosse model is often used to assess the degree of competition in banking.
This indicator catches the transmission of input prices, and thus marginal costs, on firms’
revenues. Panzar and Rosse (1987) showed that under certain assumptions, the transmis-
sion of input price variation differs according to the degree of competition in the market.
Weak transmissions are interpreted to indicate the exercise of market power in pricing
and higher values indicate more competition. Under perfect competition, an increase in
input prices raises both marginal costs and total revenues by the same amount. The elas-
ticity of bank revenues relative to input prices, also called the H-statistic, equals one. In a
market where firms collude, an increase in input prices results in a rise in marginal costs,
a fall in output, and a decline in revenues, leading to an H-statistic less than or equal
11
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to zero. Panzar and Rosse (1987) and Vesala (1995) show that when the H-statistic lies
between 0 and 1, the system is operating under monopolistic competition. The value of
the H-statistic is calculated in two steps. First, the logarithm of total revenues is regres-
sed against the logarithm of input prices for each country and other control variables as
follows (more details can be found in Schaeck et al., 2009) :
ln(Revit) = α +
L∑
l=1
βlln(wl,it) +
K∑
k=1
γkZk,it + µi + εit (1)
where subscripts i, t refers respectively to bank and year. Three inputs (wl,it) are consi-
dered : labor, physical capital and deposits. The model is run by country over the period
1990-2010 and includes bank fixed effects (µi) and control variables (Zk,it). Adding the
estimated coefficients for each input price in the second step allows us to obtain the value
of the H-statistic :
H =
3∑
l=1
βl
Claessens and Laeven (2004) point out that the Panzar-Rosse model is well-suited to com-
pare competition between markets. An important pitfall, however, concerns identification.
The interpretation of the values of the H-statistic requires respecting many assumptions
regarding the market equilibrium, demand elasticity, cost structure or exogeneity of input
prices (Bikker et al., 2012). Finally, in this work, an additional limitation comes from data
availability. The H-statistic is available for only 35 countries which reduce the sample by
half.
Boone (2008) has recently developed a new indicator based on the idea that efficient firms
are more rewarded in more competitive markets. The Boone indicator is beginning to be
used in banking literature (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Delis, 2012; Tabak et al., 2012).
The basic intuition underlying this indicator is that more efficient firms achieve superior
performance in the sense of higher profit or higher market shares, and that this effect
is stronger the heavier the competition is. 5 Boone et al. (2007) shows that the Boone
indicator can be calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. To calculate this
elasticity, the log of return on assets is regressed against a log measure of marginal costs.
ln(pii) = α + βln(MCi) + εi (2)
5. The same idea was already developed by Hay and Liu (1997).
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where pii stands for profit and MCi a measure of marginal cost. Marginal costs are obtai-
ned from an estimated translog cost function with three inputs. The more negative the
β-coefficient is, the higher the level of competition is in the market. The Boone indicator
has two major advantages. On the one hand, it is based on strong theoretical founda-
tions and catches competition due both to a fall in entry barriers and to more aggressive
behavior on the part of incumbents. On the other hand, it captures the dynamics and
non-price strategy in the market, while the Panzar-Rosse model and Lerner index are
based on static price competition. These advantages come with shortcomings. The Boone
indicator approach focuses on one important relationship, affected by competition, the-
reby disregarding other aspects. Efficient gains may not be translated into higher profits
in the short-term.
The different indicators employed here catch different aspects of competition. The Ler-
ner index measures the static pricing market power, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic the
transmission of input price changes to revenues, and the Boone indicator the dynamics
of markets. Measures of competition differ greatly among countries and are imperfectly
correlated. To facilitate the reading of the results, the inverse of the concentration ratio,
the Lerner index, and the Boone indicator are used. Thus an increase of the value of the
indices is associated with an increase in the level of competition. Finally, it should be
noted that indicators of competition are computed at the country level. This may mask
subnational differences which may be important for larger countries. Furthermore, the
Bankscope data may ignore many small and domestic-owned banks in some countries.
We assume that the measures of competition used reflect the real levels of interbank
competition in local markets. 6
6. A way to overcome this issue would be to proxy the degree of competition for local markets.
Employing detailed data on China, Chong et al. (2013) proxy the level of competition in local markets
by structure of local markets. However, data requirements associated with this approach are strong.
Moreover this approach suffers from limitations associated with the structural approach.
13
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3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Impact of competition on credit availability
The first objective of this essay is to evaluate the net impact of bank competition on
firms’ credit availability. Given the nature of the dependent variable, a binary model is
required. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if firm f in
country c is not subject to credit rationing and 0 otherwise. For a binary outcome model,
the probability of observing the value 1 (or 0) is conditional to independent variables as
follows :
yfc =
1, if y
∗
fc = α + βXfc + εfc > 0,
0, if y∗fc = α + βXfc + εfc ≤ 0
where y∗fc is the latent variable and εfc is a continuously distributed variable independent
of Xfc and the distribution of εfc is symmetric around zero. A binary model is obtained
by specifying a functional cumulative distribution function for εfc.
The structure of data considered is a form of panel data with two dimensions : country
(c) and firm (f ). It could thus be important to control for unobservable heterogeneity
across countries insofar as the interest variable is country-specific. The random effects
probit model is used to take into account unobserved country heterogeneity. 7 The model
assumes that random errors are divided into two parts :
εfc = µc + νfc,
where µc ∼ N (0, σ2µ) is the specific country effect and νfc ∼ N (0, σ2ε) the pure random
effect.
The basic econometric specification estimation through the random effect probit estimator
is as follows :
Pr(Creditfc = 1) = Φ(α + βCompetitionc + ΘFfc + ΓCc) (3)
7. In a non-linear model, including fixed-effects is ”technically” possible without removing time-
invariant variables. However, this method biases estimated coefficients because of the incidental pa-
rameters problem (Wooldridge, 2010). The ”fixed-effects” conditional logit model cannot be implemented
because it induces a drop of ”invariant” variables (all country characteristics including competition here).
To test the robustness, we also run a pooled probit model with standard errors clustered at the country
level. Results are largely unchanged and often reinforce the conclusion.
14
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where subscripts f and c refer to firm and country respectively. Creditfc is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if firm f in country c is not credit constrainted ; Ffc is the matrix
of firm characteristics and Cc the matrix of country characteristics. Competitionc is the
indicator of bank competition (concentration ratio, Lerner index, H-statistic or Boone
indicator). The net impact of bank competition on credit availability is given by the sign
of coefficient β. If β > 0 more competition induces less financing constraints in line with
the market power hypothesis. By contrast, β < 0 confirms the information hypothesis
arguing that competition hinders access to finance.
The firm-level variables control for observable firm-level heterogeneity. They include the
size and age of the firm, the top manager’s years of experience in the firm’s sector, and the
share of assets held by the largest owner. They also consider dummy variables capturing
whether the firm is an exporter, foreign-owned, or government-owned and if the firm was
audited in the past year, belongs to a larger firm, is privately held or is listed. Industry
dummies are included to control for unobservable characteristics shared by firms in the
same sector.
A crucial issue concerns the identification of the net impact of competition. The coeffi-
cient associated to competition is biased if this variable captures other characteristics. To
overcome the omitted variable issue, country-level characteristics correlated with credit
availability and bank competition are included as control variables. The level of economic
and financial development are taken into account by adding the logarithm of real GDP
per capita and the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. The macroeconomic conditions are
captured by the real growth and the inflation rate. The measure of institutional develop-
ment developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) is added. Furthermore, the depth of credit
information and the strength of legal rights are often advanced to explain differences in
both access to finance and competition. We employ the measure of creditors’ protection
and depth of credit information calculated by Doing Business for each country to control
for both. Finally, for judging the potential impact of the current financial crisis, a dummy
variable taking value 1 if the survey was implemented between 2009 and 2011 is added.
All country-level variables (competition measures included) are measured with one lag.
Presentation of variables and summary statistics are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
15
Etudes et Documents no 13, CERDI , 2014
3.2 Disentangling the impact on borrowers and lenders
In the second step, an analysis of determinants of the borrowers decision to apply and
the banks approval/denial decision. Until now, the literature has focused on the lender’s
decision in order to explain the financing gap. This approach is not directly in line with
the data. Recent works on developing countries have shown that the low use of formal
credit is mainly explained by borrower discouragement rather than banks’ denial decisions
(Bigsten et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2011; Cole and Dietrich, 2012). In the data used here,
42% of firms with a need for external funds refused to apply, although only 15% of requests
were turned down. An advantage of the database is the possibility of investigating to what
extend the low incidence of bank credit in developing countries is the result of low credit
demand and/or supply-side constraints and factors influencing both.
To investigate the determinants of the decision of a given firm to apply, it is important
to control for firms who do not need external financing. Similarly, the bank’s decision to
approve or deny a request is only available for applicants. A simple probit model is no
longer valid due to the sample selection issue (Heckman, 1979). The probit with sample
selection (PSS) model proposed by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) is thus employed. 8
The PSS model is an extension of the bivariate probit model, which itself is an extension
of the univariate probit model. The PSS estimate two probit equations (selection and
outcome equations) :
y∗1 = x1β1 + ε1 ∀i = 1, . . . , N (Selection equation)
y∗2 = x2β2 + ε2 if y1 = 1 (Outcome equation)
(4)
where error terms follow a bivariate normal distribution : (ε1, ε2) ∼ N(0, 0; 1, 1, ρ). 9 The
selection equation is completely observed, but we have only a selected sample for the
outcome equation.
To our knowledge, the PSS model is only available for pooled estimation (without control-
ling for country heterogeneity). As a result, the pooled PSS model is used. The relevance
of the sample selection problem is tested through a Wald test. Under the null hypothesis,
8. A common way to the solve sample selection issue consists of including the inverse of the Mills
ratio in a two-steps approach. However, Greene (2006) shows that this method is flawed in nonlinear
applications.
9. E(ε1) = 0,E(ε2) = 0, V ar(ε1) = 1, V ar(ε2) = 1 and Cov(ε1, ε2) = ρ
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both errors terms are uncorrelated (ρ = 0) and therefore the PSS model does not give
more information than the simple pooled probit model. Good identification requires that
at least one variable is included in the selection equation and does not appear in the
outcome equation (x1 = [x2, z]).
Models are estimated by implementing the the pooled probit with sample selection model.
Exclusion variables are presented below and firm- and country-level control variables are
the same as previously. To allow correlation across the error terms within a specific
country, the standard errors are clustered at the country level for each model.
4 Results
4.1 Impact of competition on credit availability
This section presents the results of the empirical test of the link between competition
and credit availability. Four different proxies of competition are used : the share of assets
held by the three largest banks, the Lerner index, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, and the
Boone indicator. The country pairwise correlations, reported in the Appendix, show that
measures of competition are highly correlated with the share of firms that are financially
constrained. The proxies for competition are also highly correlated with other country
characteristics highlighting the importance of controlling for other country characteristics.
Table 2 presents the baseline results using a random effect probit estimator. The first
column reports the results of estimation including only firm-level variables. The second
column provides the results for a regression without banking sector competition variables.
In the following columns, the four different proxies for competition (CR3, Lerner index,
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, and Boone indicator) are included sequentially. The Wald tests
show the presence of unobservable country heterogeneity. 10
Results document that banking competition enhances the financing of firms in developing
countries. The coefficient associated to the concentration ratio is not different from zero.
Put differently, the structure of the market does not explain the access to credit. The co-
10. The pooled probit models provide, however, close results regarding the impact of competition
proxies both in terms of size and significance.
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efficient associated to the Lerner index is not significant at the usual thresholds but it is
significant if the threshold is extended to 15%. Despite the fact that studies often employ
it, the Lerner index is not the best measure of competition, as discussed above. We there-
fore also test the relationship between competition and credit availability by considering
two other non-structural measures of competition : the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the
Boone indicator. The coefficients associated to both proxies of competition are positive
and significantly different from zero, indicating that firms face lower credit rationing in
countries with more competitive markets.
The economic impact of competition is also significant. A one-standard deviation change
in the level of interbank competition (Lerner index, Boone indicator or H-statistic) results
in a reduction of 2 percentage point in the probability of being rationed. While this may
appear to be a small impact, in comparison with other country- and firm-level variables
the effect of competition is not insignificant. By comparison, a one standard deviation
change in the inflation rate induces a similar change. The fact that a firm is foreign-owned,
privately held or has 5 additional employees increasesits probability of being constrained
by 4 percentage points.
The results for control variables are consistent with expectations. Firms which are larger,
foreign-owned, members of a group (subsidiary), audited, and privately held are less likely
to suffer from credit rationing. The crisis dummy has a negative coefficient while not al-
ways significant. Nonetheless, the economic impact of the crisis is important insofar as the
probability of having credit constraints increases by 5 percentage points following 2009.
At the country-level, credit binding is related to the economic environment in which firms
operate. Credit rationing is more likely in less economically developed countries and in
countries with unstable economic environment (high inflation). The coefficient associated
to financial development is positive but not always significant. In particular, when unob-
servable country characteristics are controlled for, it becomes statistically insignificant.
4.2 Disentangling the impact on borrowers and lenders
The baseline set-up shows that competition alleviates credit constraints in developing
countries, which is in line with the market power hypothesis. In this section, we try
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to go one step further by investigating by which channels competition plays a role in
facilitating access to finance. Specifically, we try to disentangle the impact of market
power on borrowers and lenders.
4.2.1 Impact of bank competition on a firm’s decision to apply
Borrower discouragement can be explained by many economic and non-economic factors
(Kon and Storey, 2003). Interbank competition can exert an effect on the borrower’s
decision to apply for a loan (e.g. rates are reduced, products are more suited or the
probability to be approved is higher). In order to analyze the determinants of the decision
of a given firm to apply, pooled PSS models are run. Econometric strategy is conditional to
the exclusion variables employed. Exclusion variables have to affect the needs for external
funds but not directly impact a firm’s decision to apply or a bank’s willingness to finance.
Two variables are used to proxy the need for funds. The proportion of the value of sales
paid after the delivery by the customers in the previous year is considered. This variable
catches the need of funds for financing working capital. We also add a dummy variable
equal to one if the firm submitted an application to obtain a construction permit over
the prior two years, approximating the willingness to invest. 11
Results show that the likelihood of applying for a loan increases with the level of compe-
tition. Table 3 presents the determinants of the decision for a given firm with a need for
credit to apply or not. The degree of competition is evaluated by employing four different
measures (CR3, Lerner index, Boone indicator, and H-statistic). Coefficients associated
to the Boone indicator and H-statistic are positive and significant. As in the previous
section, the coefficients associated to the share of assets held by the three largest banks
11. Brown et al. (2011) use the share of working capital financed by retained earnings over the past
year. However, one may consider this to be a weak exclusion variable. This variable may be directly
related to a firm’s decision to apply. A larger share of working capital financed by internal finance does
not only reflect a larger credit need but also the difficulty of obtaining these funds from other financing
sources. One may expect that firms closely linked to banks finance a larger share of their working capital
needs through bank financing but are also less discouraged from applying (because they believe that
their request will not be denied). It is interesting to underline that the share of working capital financed
by banks is used as a measure of access to credit in the literature (Love et al., 2013). Nonetheless, simple
probit models are run to test the robustness of the set of selection variables used.
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(CR3) and the Lerner index are not significant at the usual thresholds. Firms in more
competitive markets may be less reluctant to apply for a loan. An increase in the Boone
indicator or Panzar-Rosse H-statistic by one standard deviation will result in between a
2.3 (Boone) and 3.2 (H-statistic) percentage point rise in the probability of applying. By
comparison, an increase of one standard deviation in the level of financial development
will induce an increase of 7 percentage points. The positive impact of competition on a
firm’s decision to apply could be justified by different channels such as lower credit costs,
less procedural requirements, well-designed products and services, better access to bank
branches or a higher probability of being financed.
Control variables give some other interesting insights. Larger, audited, privately held firms
and exporters, as well as firms in which the managers have less experience, are subject to
discouragement. The levels of financial and economic development are strongly correlated
with a firm’s probability of applying for a loan.
4.2.2 Impact of bank competition on a bank’s approval decision
If competitive pressure reduces borrower discouragement, competition can also increase
the probability of applicants being financed. Insofar as a bank’s final decision is only
available for applicants, pooled PSS models are used. A good exclusion variable must
impact the likelihood that a firm will apply but should not be observed or taken into
account by banks. According to the standard theory, physical capital and labor are, at
least partially, related (substitutes or complements). The demand for loans is therefore
related to the severity of the obstacles in the labor market perceived by the firm. At the
same time, it would be surprising if a lender based its decision on this information (if we
suppose that a bank could obtain it). The obstacles in the labor market are measured
through a firm’s assessment of the severity induced by an inadequately educated workforce
on the firm’s growth.
Results, reported in Table 4 indicate that the probability of being rejected is lower in
countries with more competitive banking markets. The coefficients associated with the
Boone indicator and H-statistic are positive and significant at the usual thresholds. The
coefficient associated to the Lerner index is positive and significant at 15 percent. Bank
concentration is, however, unrelated to the likelihood of applicants being satisfied. Harsher
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competition leads to softer loan approval decisions but market structure plays no role.
The economic impact of competition is also significant. An increase of competition by one-
standard deviation will raise the probability of being satisfied by one percentage point
(for the three non-structural measures of competition). By comparison, an increase of two
points in depth information index and legal rights (about one standard deviation) implies
an increase in probability of between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. The positive effect
of competition on a bank’s decision to approve or deny is relatively easy to understand.
In countries with low levels of competition, a bank can easily turn down an application
without cost. By contrast, in competitive markets, the choice to deny implies the risk of
losing long-term relationship benefits. Indeed, a denied borrower will contact a rival if it
believes that its project is viable. The borrower and rival bank may enter into a long-term
relationship and it could be impossible or very costly for outside banks to subsequently
attract the firm. Private information may constrain competition in the future (Sharpe,
1990).
Results regarding the control variables are in line with expectations. Banks are less re-
luctant to finance transparent firms (larger, older, exporter), or firms linked with a larger
one. Following the crisis, banks are less willing to finance firms. The probability of obtai-
ning a loan has been reduced by 3 percentage points in the wake of the crisis. Information
sharing mechanisms and creditors protection, despite the lack of net impact on credit avai-
lability, have a positive effect on the probability of applicants being financed. In other
words, uncertainty and opacity play a significant role in explaining a bank’s decision to
approve or turn down credit requests.
4.3 Relationship lending versus price effect
The baseline results document the positive effect of competition on credit availability
through its impact on borrowers and lenders. However, banking competition can enhance
credit availability through increasing relationship lending and/or lowering the interest
rate (transaction-based lending technologies). For instance, observing that firms are less
reluctant to apply in competitive markets is uninformative. Firms in more competitive
markets can apply because credit conditions are more favorable or because they think
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they will be approved. In this sub-section, we try to give some insights about this debate.
Opaque firms are more likely to benefit from an intensification of relationships rather than
from lower prices. If banking competition increases credit availability through expanding
relationship lending, we can predict that small and young firms will be impacted more
than their counterparts (Chong et al., 2013). We therefore investigate the implications of
competition on different sub-groups of firms, classifying them according to their size and
age. In this section, the attention is focused on the two measures of competition positi-
vely related to credit availability : namely the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Boone
indicator. The sample is split according to the size and age of firms. Results, reported in
Table 5 Panel A, suggest that smaller firms are not more (or less) affected by competition
than larger ones. 12 However, results reported in Panel B show that competition is bene-
ficial mainly for older firms. Both the coefficients associated to Panzar-Rosse H-statistic
and Boone indicator show that the youngest firms (less than five years of operations) do
not take advantage of fiercer competition. On the contrary, firms established for more
than five years benefit more from harsher competition. This suggests that the beneficial
effect of competition is larger for well-established than for newly-established firms. Older
firms are more sensitive to changes in prices than to increases in relationships. They are
more transparent having more assets and a longer credit history. The findings are more
in line with the price channel hypothesis. Fierce competition in credit markets may lower
interest rate directly or indirectly by softening terms of the loan (collateral requirements,
informal payments, etc.).
In order to provide more insight, we investigate in detail the reasons for the refusal to
apply. Under the price effect channel, competitive pressure should increase the loan de-
mand for firms reporting high interest rates, collateral requirements or the necessity to
make informal payments to justify their decision. By contrast, the demand for loans for
firms reporting another reason (satisfaction probability, procedures, etc.) should be less
affected by the degree of competition. We then divide discouraged borrowers into firms
that justify their choice by price factors and other firms. We investigate the determinants
of applications on each sub-sample using the PSS model. The first dependent variable is
12. Large firms tend to benefit less than SMEs from competition. A possible explanation is the fact
that larger firms already have access to finance.
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a dummy taken the value of one if the firm applied for a loan and 0 if the firm refused to
apply because it considered that the loan terms to be unsatisfactory (other discouraged
firms are excluded). The second dependent variable takes the value 0 if the firm refused
to apply because they expected to be denied or the procedures were complex. The re-
sults are reported in Table 6. The coefficient associated to the Boone indicator is always
positive. By contrast, the coefficient associated to the H-statistic is only positive when
applicants are compared to discouraged firms that report price factors as a barrier to
applying. In other words, this finding shows that competitive pressure mainly increases
the likelihood of a firm applying by reducing the direct (interest rates) or indirect (col-
lateral requirements or informal payments) costs of credit. This finding tends to confirm
the price channel in line with findings on China (Chong et al., 2013).
5 Robustness checks
One might be concerned about the robustness of the results. Although we control for
many country-level variables and use different proxies for competition, other scenarios
might explain the positive relationship between competition and credit availability. we
will discuss some other potential explanations and show that the results are relatively
robust. 13
In developing countries, the intensification of competition has been accompanied by the
globalization process and the expansion of foreign-ownership of banks. Internationaliza-
tion of banking systems can exert an impact on credit availability. Some papers document
that foreign bank presence is associated with higher access to loans for SMEs (Clarke et al.,
2006; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009), while other papers show that foreign banks tend to
finance only larger, established and more profitable firms (Berger et al., 2001; Mian, 2006;
Detragiache et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010). 14 Different degrees of competition may merely
capture the differences in ownership structure of the banking industry. To test this hypo-
13. We also run additional robustness checks changing the sample (excluding outliers) and the eco-
nometric method (employing pooled probit model) without altering our conclusions regarding the role
played by competition.
14. For a review of this question, see : Claessens and van Horen (2013); Claessens and Van Horen
(2013).
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thesis, we include as controls the share of banking assets owned by foreigners. We use the
dataset built by Claessens and van Horen (2013) to proxy the share of banking assets held
by foreigners. These variables are only available for 59 countries. The results reported in
the Appendix are robust insofar as coefficients associated to competition remain stable
in terms of size and significance. The presence of foreign banks tends to play no role on
credit availability.
The positive link between competition and access to credit can be explained by financial
regulation. Less government interference in the banking system, especially less restrictions
on bank activities, may alleviate credit constraints. For instance, in less regulated markets,
banks can propose new products more suitable for SME financing. Insofar as competition
and financial regulations are correlated, the positive coefficient associated to competition
can merely reflect the relationship between financial restrictions and credit availability.
To control for this possibility, we include a measure of financial freedom built by the
Heritage Foundation. Results highlight that the coefficients associated to competition
remain positive and significant. Including activity restrictions based on the World Bank
Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision database (Barth et al., 2005) instead of the
financial freedom variable does not alter the conclusions. 15
Another potential drawback concerns the measures of competition. The proxies of com-
petition are computed at the country level, while firms borrow locally. Insofar as many
banks in developing countries are located in major cities, the degree of competition at
the national level tends to reflect the competitive pressure in economic capitals but not
the level of competition outside. One might therefore expect that the findings are not
valid for firms located outside these cities. The surveys do not provide information about
cities where firms are located. However, surveys do give the administrative district in
which firms operate. We select a sub-sample of firms located in districts outside economic
centers for each country and rerun the model on the sub-sample of firms in remote areas.
15. In extending the argument, countries with more competitive banking markets are also countries with
less restrictions on economic activities beyond banking. Higher facility to borrow can be driven by more
”market-friendly” policies and proxies for competition catch this. However, the impact of competition
on credit access remain when different proxies for economic freedom are included such as the Economic
freedom variable from Heritage Foundation.
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The main findings are confirmed.
Finally, it is important to discuss two caveats of the paper. The surveys do not allow
us to capture the structure of loans and the dynamics of credit relationships. The paper
considers credit as uniform but it is not. Loan terms such as loan rates, loan maturity,
collateral requirements or other provisions differ greatly. The data does not allow us to
discriminate between different types of credit (e.g. short term vs. long term). In the paper,
we merely consider a firm as rationed if the firm has a need for funds but does not use
credit. However, a firm with a loan may be considered as rationed if the loan requested
differs from the loan granted (Kirschenmann, 2011; Chong et al., 2013). For example,
a firm may apply for a long-term loan and get a short-term credit or may obtain only
a share of the total amount desired. We do not believe that this issue alters our study.
The measure built in this paper allows us to detect the most financially constrained firms
(firms that did not receive credit at all). One may expect that this proxy of strong credit
rationing is closely related to partial credit rationing. Competition certainly exerts an
effect on both types of credit rationing.
Another concern involves the dynamics of credit. For instance, the data do not allow
us to observe borrowers who were rejected in a first attempt but approved in a second
attempt (after the survey) or to observe firms that had already applied in the past. Taking
into account the dynamics of relationship is crucial in the analysis of credit rationing
(Kirschenmann, 2011). However, the main results are probably not affected by this caveat.
For instance, it is possible to expect that the likelihood of denied applicants obtaining
credit after the survey would be larger in more competitive countries insofar as harsher
competition is associated with softer loan approval decisions. Nonetheless, future research
based on different databases could investigate these issues more directly.
6 Conclusion
Whether competition helps or hinders small firms’ access to finance is in itself a much
debated question in the economic literature and in policy circles. Despite the policy
relevance of this issue, empirical evidence on the effect of interbank competition on access
to finance in developing countries is scarce and largely inconclusive. Using surveys on firms
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in developing economies, this paper sheds new light on this debate. A firm is classified as
financially rationed only if it expressed a demand for formal funds that was not fulfilled
by supply. Furthermore, contrary to existing research, this paper employs several non-
structural measures of competition (Lerner index, Boone indicator, or H-statistic) in
addition to concentration measures. By confronting the findings from several measures,
this paper gives a more complete picture of the role of competition on credit availability.
Banking competition can enhance the financing of firms by increasing both the probability
that firms apply for loans and that banks do not turn down the applications. As a result,
the analysis tries to disentangle the implication of competition between banks on the
behavior of firms and of banks.
While the information hypothesis predicts that creditors are more likely to finance cre-
dit constrained firms when credit markets are competitive, the evidence from developing
countries supports the market power hypothesis. Findings, from a sample of almost 30,000
firms in 70 developing countries, show a positive impact of bank competition on credit
availability, while bank concentration has no effect. This paper documents that competi-
tive pressure not only leads to less severe loan approval decisions but that it also reduces
borrower discouragement. This conclusion is far from anecdotal insofar as the low use of
bank credit in developing economies is mainly explained by low demand rather than by
high rates of rejection. In addition, the findings tend to show that competition affects
credit availability through price effect (lower interest rates) rather than relationship effect
(banks invest more in relationship in competitive markets).
The policy implications are twofold. On the one hand, a direct policy implication is to
promote competition in credit markets. This may be materialized by developing a large
range of pro-competitive measures beyond liberalization. Liberalizing banking sectors
may be insufficient insofar as main barriers are non-legal in developing countries (Delis,
2012). For example, developing information sharing mechanisms or facilitating regional
integration could spur competition in small markets. However, competitive pressure may
be insufficient to provide funds for all firms. A secondary result of this paper documents
that banking competition enhances credit availability more by reducing prices than by
increasing relationship lending. Consequently, competition in banking is less useful for
the most opaque firms, in particular newly-established firms.
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Policy makers should also keep in mind that the low use of credit is mainly driven by
borrower discouragement. The evidence suggests that a significant portion of discouraged
firms would be successful in obtaining credit if only they would apply. Acting on the
demand-side is thus crucial if policy makers expect to raise the share of financing of firms
by formal financial institutions. Academics should examine in more detail the reasons for
borrower discouragement to help the design of effective policies. Discouragement can be
justified by both economic and non-economic factors and by both individual and group
considerations. Better understanding discouragement in credit markets could be useful
in explaining the success and failure of some reforms in these markets. Furthermore,
while the paper examines credit constraints from the quantity perspective, it would be
interesting to investigate how competition affects loan contract terms, including interest
rates, collateral requirements, amount and loan maturity. This may document the debate
between the lending relationship and price effect channels but such investigations require
new databases.
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7 Tables
Table 1 – Access to finance and interbank competition
Country % of firms Interbank competition
Rationed Disc. Denied CR3 Lerner Boone H-st.
Africa (25 countries)
Angola 0.81 0.83 0.75 74.60 0.44 -0.14
Botswana 0.25 0.81 0.23 74.39 0.25 -0.07
Burundi 0.58 0.73 0.33 100.00 0.05
Congo 0.52 0.83 0.33 100.00 0.14
D.R. Congo 0.84 0.88 0.71 61.59 -0.20
Gabon 0.39 0.86 0.27 96.62 -0.01
Gambia 0.57 0.86 0.32 90.42 0.02
Ghana 0.66 0.76 0.36 79.26 0.22 -0.19
Ivory Coast 0.78 0.86 0.32 59.63 0.24 -0.05
Lesotho 0.31 0.68 0.30 100.00 0.00
Liberia 0.44 0.77 0.06 100.00 0.00
Madagascar 0.39 0.76 0.13 89.72 0.00
Mali 0.76 0.73 0.66 70.03 0.32 -0.11
Mauritania 0.76 0.76 0.62 66.89 0.36 0.02
Mauritius 0.19 0.73 0.19 50.56 0.29 -0.14
Mozambique 0.72 0.84 0.41 95.62 0.24 -0.04
Namibia 0.19 0.79 0.31 88.70 0.00
Rwanda 0.47 0.67 0.22 87.01 -0.06
Senegal 0.68 0.77 0.47 67.24 -0.07 0.38
Sierra Leone 0.56 0.72 0.18 60.79 0.14 -0.33
South Africa 0.28 0.78 0.12 70.94 0.29 -0.05 0.87
Swaziland 0.27 0.80 0.16 67.67 -0.23
Tanzania 0.63 0.78 0.21 55.50 0.28 -0.09
Uganda 0.56 0.80 0.15 62.99 -0.04
Zambia 0.43 0.78 0.19 51.92 0.35 -0.10 0.18
Latin America and the Caribbean (16 countries)
Argentina 0.34 0.66 0.10 43.21 0.29 -0.22 0.49
Bolivia 0.28 0.61 0.08 50.25 0.17 -0.14 0.65
Brazil 0.23 0.46 0.18 49.89 0.36 -0.05 0.75
Chile 0.11 0.41 0.03 54.90 0.30 -0.05
Colombia 0.16 0.39 0.06 41.39 0.27 -0.02 0.78
Ecuador 0.13 0.44 0.04 48.10 -0.75 0.95
ElSalvador 0.20 0.57 0.08 67.50 0.33 -0.07 0.99
Guatemala 0.18 0.69 0.08 48.03 0.19 -0.07
Honduras 0.23 0.58 0.09 40.75 0.19 -0.05 0.88
Mexico 0.27 0.90 0.16 59.03 0.19 -0.13
Nicaragua 0.24 0.64 0.09 84.00 0.37 -1.59
Panama 0.12 0.71 0.02 48.84 0.31 -0.04 0.57
continued on next page
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Country % of firms Interbank competition
Rationed Disc. Denied CR3 Lerner Boone H-st.
Paraguay 0.23 0.62 0.05 47.77 0.12 -0.11 0.86
Peru 0.16 0.37 0.03 76.51 0.32 -0.09 0.62
Uruguay 0.34 0.71 0.09 57.57 0.24 0.54 0.78
Europe and Central Asia (26 countries)
Albania 0.14 0.72 0.01 88.34 0.26 -0.01
Armenia 0.21 0.58 0.09 43.32 0.31 -0.14 0.76
Azerbaijan 0.44 0.83 0.39 59.70 0.28 -0.08 0.60
Belarus 0.21 0.42 0.09 82.56 0.29 -0.11 0.81
Bosnia 0.27 0.42 0.15 49.32 0.18 -0.04
Bulgaria 0.25 0.78 0.13 38.73 0.28 -0.51 0.30
Croatia 0.25 0.52 0.18 56.05 0.18 -0.06 0.41
CzechRep 0.15 0.58 0.11 58.69 0.22 -0.09 0.73
Estonia 0.11 0.54 0.12 92.52 0.16 0.04
Macedonia 0.27 0.62 0.19 70.18 0.21 -0.06 -0.02
Georgia 0.23 0.54 0.13 70.64 0.24 -0.17 0.61
Hungary 0.10 0.69 0.07 53.51 0.19 -0.08 0.66
Kazakhstan 0.28 0.62 0.18 56.00 0.31 0.17 0.57
Latvia 0.22 0.58 0.19 57.60 0.28 0.09 0.90
Lithuania 0.13 0.49 0.10 72.71 0.18 0.15 0.79
Moldova 0.29 0.49 0.19 45.50 0.24 -0.10 0.42
Mongolia 0.35 0.41 0.22 96.93 -0.05
Montenegro 0.37 0.53 0.14 79.41 -0.09
Poland 0.20 0.63 0.13 48.68 0.24 -0.09 0.81
Romania 0.17 0.53 0.10 64.37 0.20 -0.10 0.91
Russia 0.27 0.49 0.18 38.84 0.25 -0.04 0.67
Serbia 0.26 0.40 0.19 33.47 0.17 -0.20 0.63
Slovak Rep. 0.16 0.63 0.10 66.02 0.21 0.03 0.59
Slovenia 0.09 0.40 0.09 51.72 0.15 -0.03 0.55
Tajikistan 0.31 0.63 0.17 100.00 0.11
Turkey 0.15 0.43 0.16 43.94 0.21 -0.02 0.61
Ukraine 0.33 0.62 0.12 26.08 0.22 -0.12 0.69
Others (3 countries)
Iraq 0.58 0.85 0.49 57.41 0.00
Laos 0.31 0.88 0.00 88.29 0.17
SriLanka 0.51 0.77 0.05 54.64 -0.11
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Table 2 – Interbank competition and credit availability
Measure of competition
None None CR3 Lerner Boone H-stat
Firm-level variables
ln(Firm size) 0.0586*** 0.0531*** 0.0532*** 0.0491*** 0.0530*** 0.0519***
(17.64) (18.15) (18.15) (15.92) (18.21) (15.29)
ln(Age) 0.0070† 0.0060† 0.0061† 0.0065† 0.0060† 0.0036
(1.53) (1.48) (1.48) (1.49) (1.47) (0.73)
ln(Exp) -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0068
(-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.58) (-0.37) (-1.30)
Largest ow. -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002†
(-0.38) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-1.06) (-0.49) (-1.60)
For.-owned 0.0393*** 0.0367*** 0.0366*** 0.0354*** 0.0365*** 0.0202*
(3.85) (4.00) (3.98) (3.48) (4.00) (1.67)
Gov.-owned -0.0576† -0.0497 -0.0500 -0.0469 -0.0466 -0.0666†
(-1.47) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.23) (-1.32) (-1.49)
Exporter 0.0104 0.0087 0.0088 0.0119 0.0088 0.0147†
(1.12) (1.04) (1.05) (1.39) (1.05) (1.60)
Subsidiary 0.0499*** 0.0449*** 0.0449*** 0.0439*** 0.0444*** 0.0398***
(5.56) (5.56) (5.55) (5.10) (5.52) (4.06)
Audited 0.0530*** 0.0476*** 0.0477*** 0.0382*** 0.0474*** 0.0279***
(7.90) (7.88) (7.87) (5.95) (7.87) (3.85)
Publicly listed 0.0057 0.0055 0.0056 0.0040 0.0059 0.0047
(0.37) (0.40) (0.41) (0.28) (0.43) (0.29)
Privately held 0.0429*** 0.0384*** 0.0386*** 0.0329*** 0.0382*** 0.0274***
(5.59) (5.50) (5.51) (4.49) (5.49) (3.23)
Crisis -0.0501* -0.0565** -0.0586** -0.0788*** -0.0487** -0.0258*
(-1.80) (-2.43) (2.47) (-3.03) (-2.10) (-1.74)
Country-level variables
Competition -0.0003 0.3043† 0.0967* 0.1197*
(-0.51) (1.48) (1.86) (1.86)
Fin. Dev. 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001
(0.74) (0.76) (0.67) (0.69) (0.15)
ln(GDPpc) 0.0768*** 0.0799*** 0.0714*** 0.0797*** 0.0407†
(3.91) (3.89) (3.21) (4.12) (1.46)
Growth 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0049 0.0012 0.0000
(0.23) (0.23) (-1.05) (0.37) (0.00)
Inflation -0.0022* -0.0022* -0.0019 -0.0023** -0.0062**
(-1.88) (-1.90) (-1.61) (-1.99) (-2.17)
Legal Rights 0.0052 0.0059 0.0114* 0.0042 0.0057
(0.83) (0.92) (1.75) (0.68) (0.81)
Credit Info 0.0041 0.0045 0.0109 0.0012 0.0047
(0.49) (0.53) (1.22) (0.15) (0.51)
Inst. Dev. 0.0007 -0.0037 -0.0138 0.0087 -0.0207
(0.02) (-0.10) (-0.38) (0.25) (-0.38)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# firms 28949 28949 28949 23550 28929 17755
# Countries 70 70 70 51 69 35
LR test 2517.08*** 1095.28*** 1093.27*** 740.62*** 1025.29*** 338.15***
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to 1 if the firm is not subject to financing rationing. Inverse of CR3, Lerner
index and Boone indicator are used in the table. The LR test compares the pooled estimator (probit) with the panel
estimator. Under null hypothesis, the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. MEs are reported,
and z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. †, *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 3 – Interbank competition and loan applications
Measure of competition
None None CR3 Lerner Boone Hstat
Firm-level variables
ln(Firm size) 0.0814*** 0.0782*** 0.0782*** 0.0742*** 0.0781*** 0.0786***
(12.49) (12.69) (12.66) (10.42) (12.76) (18.08)
ln(Age) -0.0035 -0.0120† -0.0120† -0.0091 -0.0134* -0.0207***
(-0.42) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-1.14) (-1.89) (-2.64)
ln(Exp) 0.0365*** 0.0151** 0.0151** 0.0115* 0.0131* 0.0036
(3.84) (2.13) (2.11) (1.77) (1.91) (0.57)
Largest ow. -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003†
(-0.61) (-0.72) (-0.74) (-1.00) (-0.95) (-1.48)
For.-owned -0.0544*** -0.0131 -0.0126 -0.0100 -0.0145 -0.0096
(-3.33) (-1.27) (-1.21) (-0.84) (-1.39) (-0.81)
Gov.-owned -0.1076 -0.0625 -0.0614 -0.0527 -0.0584 -0.0561
(-1.40) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-0.70) (-0.92) (-0.70)
Exporter 0.0654*** 0.0484 0.0483*** 0.0471*** 0.0476*** 0.0460***
(3.94) (3.36) (3.36) (3.39) (3.30) (3.79)
Subsidiary -0.0042 -0.0063 -0.0065 -0.0064 -0.0048 -0.0073
(-0.33) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.35) (-0.47)
Audited 0.0717*** 0.0641*** 0.0640*** 0.0554*** 0.0655*** 0.0463***
(4.42) (4.25) (4.15) (3.31) (4.32) (4.28)
Publicly listed 0.0734** 0.0412† 0.0410† 0.0049 0.0411† -0.0029
(2.45) (1.57) (1.56) (0.21) (1.61) (-0.11)
Privately held 0.1305*** 0.0783*** 0.0780*** 0.0557*** 0.0777*** 0.0441***
(5.21) (4.23) (4.21) (3.72) (4.44) (3.05)
Crisis 0.0328 -0.0084 -0.0087 0.0210 0.0006 0.0907***
(0.95) (-0.26) (-0.26) (0.66) (0.02) (2.74)
Country-level variables
Competition 0.0001 0.0794 0.0974** 0.1441**
(0.08) (0.38) (2.08) (2.32)
Fin. Dev. 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0025** 0.0032*** 0.0009
(2.65) (2.65) (2.16) (2.66) (0.86)
ln(GDPpc) 0.0504** 0.0499** 0.0464* 0.0543** 0.0613*
(2.22) (2.11) (1.72) (2.30) (1.72)
Growth -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0066 0.0002 -0.0028
(-0.09) (-0.08) (-1.03) (0.04) (-0.35)
Inflation -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0116***
(-1.24) (-1.21) (-1.44) (-1.50) (-4.36)
Legal Rights -0.0077 -0.0080 -0.0076 -0.0091 0.0051
(-1.08) (-1.02) (1.02) (-1.31) (0.57)
Credit Info 0.0038 0.0040 0.0015 0.0004 -0.0083
(0.44) (0.46) (0.17) (0.05) (-1.32)
Inst. Dev. -0.0251 -0.0242 -0.0252 -0.0135 -0.1499**
(-0.68) (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.40) (-1.93)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# firms 18238 18238 18238 14572 18225 10978
# Countries 70 70 70 51 69 35
Wald test (ρ = 0) 162.71*** 70.92*** 74.49*** 0.57 69.27** 20.75***
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to 1 if the firm with a need for funds applied. Inverse of CR3, Lerner
index and Boone indicator are used in the table. Probit with sample selection (PSS) issue is used. The Wald test
compares the pooled estimator (probit) with the PSS model. Under null hypothesis, the PSS estimator is not
different from the pooled estimator. MEs are reported, and z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. †, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively.
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Table 4 – Interbank competition and loan rejection/acceptation
Measure of competition
None None CR3 Lerner Boone Hstat
Firm-level variables
ln(Firm size) 0.0089*** 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0093*** 0.0091**
(3.31) (3.54) (3.56) (3.86) (3.68) (2.04)
ln(Age) 0.0208*** 0.0197*** 0.0198*** 0.0182*** 0.0188*** 0.0162***
(5.59) (5.71) (5.69) (4.89) (5.67) (3.44)
ln(Exp) 0.0064† 0.0009 0.0012 0.0019 0.0003 -0.0069
(1.47) (0.22) (0.28) (0.48) (0.08) (-1.23)
Largest ow. -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.13) (0.19) (0.15) (0.76) (.0.08) (-0.37)
For.-owned 0.0107 0.0197** 0.0192** 0.0121 0.0190* 0.0057
(1.16) (2.02) (2.07) (1.17) (1.95) (0.51)
Gov.-owned -0.0090 0.0066 0.0054 0.0030 0.0074 -0.0313
(-0.33) (0.29) (0.24) (0.14) (0.33) (-1.33)
Exporter -0.0099 -0.0156* -0.0156* -0.0138* -0.0158* -0.0098
(-1.14) (-1.85) (-1.85) (-1.75) (-1.87) (-1.32)
Subsidiary 0.0203*** 0.0202*** 0.0200*** 0.0205*** 0.0197*** 0.0169**
(2.66) (2.83) (2.80) (3.05) (2.79) (2.42)
Audited 0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0079 -0.0004 -0.0088
(0.38) (-0.14) (-0.19) (-1.21) (-0.06) (-1.20)
Publicly listed 0.0146 0.0080 0.0086 0.0182† 0.0074 0.0165
(1.17) (0.60) (0.64) (1.48) (0.55) (1.31)
Privately held 0.0333*** 0.0173** 0.0180** 0.0209*** 0.0174** 0.0052
(3.00) (2.07) (2.10) (2.73) (2.12) (0.67)
Crisis -0.0342** -0.0464*** -0.0467*** -0.0630*** -0.0434*** -0.0421***
(-2.43) (-3.37) (-3.38) (-5.12) (-3.14) (-3.01)
Country-level variables
Competition -0.0002 0.1242† 0.0323** 0.0442**
(-0.50) (1.51) (2.30) (2.04)
Fin. Dev. 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0009*
(0.63) (0.63) (0.60) (0.59) (1.79)
ln(GDPpc) 0.0047 0.0065 0.0035 0.0055 -0.0036
(0.46) (0.54) (0.32) (0.53) (-0.32)
Growth 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0022 0.0003 0.0051*
(0.06) (0.04) (-0.83) (0.13) (1.79)
Inflation -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0032**
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-0.56) (-1.32) (-1.98)
Legal Rights 0.0078*** 0.0081** 0.0097*** 0.0074** 0.0066**
(2.58) (2.31) (3.04) (2.46) (1.98)
Credit Info 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0141*** 0.0108*** 0.0128***
(3.59) (3.53) (4.26) (3.18) (4.21)
Inst. Dev. -0.0101 -0.0128 -0.0095 -0.0071 -0.0351
(-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.41) (-1.22)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# firms 10597 10597 10597 9027 10592 7461
# Countries 70 70 70 51 69 35
Wald test (ρ = 0) 2.71* 6.42** 5.89** 12.45*** 7.76*** 1.93
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to 1 if the applicant received a loan (and 0 otherwise). Inverse of CR3,
Lerner index and Boone indicator are used in the table. Probit with sample selection (PSS) issue is used. The Wald
test compares the pooled estimator (probit) with the PSS model. Under null hypothesis, the PSS estimator is not
different from the pooled estimator. MEs are reported, and z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. †, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively.
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Table 5 – Interbank competition and credit availability, by firm size and age
Panel A : Firm size
Boone indicator H-statistic
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Competition 0.1143* 0.1053* 0.0533† 0.1267* 0.1176* 0.0878*
(1.88) (1.94) (1.41) (1.65) (1.92) (1.86)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15513 5981 7435 8430 3969 5356
# Countries 69 69 69 35 35 35
LR test 616.27*** 141.83*** 88.51*** 204.53*** 30.33*** 25.90***
Panel B : Firm age
Boone indicator H-statistic
Young Medium Old Young Medium Old
Competition 0.0758 0.1057* 0.1088** 0.1087 0.1007* 0.1130*
(1.06) (1.91) (2.43) (1.24) (1.64) (1.78)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# firms 4772 12795 11362 2405 7914 7436
# Countries 69 69 69 35 35 35
LR test 175.80*** 363.01*** 274.83*** 38.96*** 83.51*** 111.30***
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to 1 if the firm is not subject to financing rationing. Small-sized firms
are less than 20 employees, medium-sized have more than 20 employees but less than 50 and large firms, and large
firms have more than 50 employees. Young firms assembles firms operate for less than five years and old firms are
firms with more than 15 years of operations. Inverse of Boone indicator is used in the table. The LR test compares
the pooled estimator (probit) with the panel estimator. Under null hypothesis, the panel estimator is not different
from the pooled estimator. MEs are reported, and z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the country-level. †, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
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Table 6 – Interbank competition and loan applications, by reasons
Boone indicator H-statistic
Price Other Price Other
Competition 0.0540* 0.0458** 0.1308*** .0138
(1.66) (2.22) (3.43) (0.39)
Firm controls
Industry FE
Country controls
# firms 15487 13330 9729 8710
# Countries 69 69 35 35
Wald test (ρ = 0) 66.30*** 37.04*** 38.74*** 7.72***
The Price variable is a dummy equals to 1 if the applicant received a loan and
0 if the firm refused to apply owing to contract term consideration (e.g. in-
terest rates or collateral requirements). The Other variable is a dummy equals
to 1 if the applicant received a loan and 0 if the firm refused to apply due to
other consideration (e.g. expected that demand will be turned down). Inverse of
Boone indicator is used in the table. Probit with sample selection (PSS) issue
is used. The Wald test compares the pooled estimator (probit) with the PSS
model. Under null hypothesis, the PSS estimator is not different from the poo-
led estimator. MEs are reported, and z-statistics are presented in parentheses.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and ***
and indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 7 – Variables description and data source
Variable Description Source
Dependent variables
Credit Dummy variable equals to 0 if the firm is classified as Discouraged or as Denied and
1 otherwise
WBESa
Need Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm needed external funds in the last year WBES
Apply Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm needed external funds and applied for loans
and 0 if the firm did not apply
WBES
Accepted Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm applied for loans and received at least one
line of credit and 0 if the firm applied but did not receive a line of credit
WBES
Independent variables
Interbank competition
CR3 Share of banking system assets held by the three largest banks GFDDb
Lerner Value of the Lerner index GFDD
Boone Value of the Boone index GFDD
H-stats Value of the H-statistics GFDD
Firm-level control variables
Firm size Number of permanent full-time employees WBES
Age Age of the firms (in years) WBES
Exporter Dummy variable equals to 1 if 10% or more of sales are exported WBES
Foreign-owned Dummy variable equals to 1 if 50% or more of the firm is owned by foreign organization WBES
Government-owned Dummy variable equals to 1 if 50% or more of the firm is owned by the government WBES
Experience Experience in this sector that the top manager has (in years) WBES
Largest owner Share of assets held by the largest owner WBES
Audited Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm have its annual financial statement checked
and certified by an external auditor
WBES
Subsidiary Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is part of larger firm WBES
Publicly listed Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firms is a publicly listed company WBES
Privately held Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firms is a limited liability company WBES
Country-level control variables
Financial Development Domestic credit to the private sector to GDP GFDD
GDPpc GDP per capita (Constant USD) WDIc
Inflation Annual change in the GDP deflator WDI
Growth Real growth of the GDP WDI
Credit information Depth of credit information index is a measure of the coverage, scope and accessibility
of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private
credit bureau (0-6)
DBd
Legal Rights The strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and ban-
kruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders (0-10)
DB
Institution Dev. Composite index of institutional development WGIe
Crisis Dummy variable equals to 1 if year ≥ 2009
Selection variables
WK Proportion of goods or services paid for after the delivery WBES
Construction Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm submit an application to obtain a contruction-
related permit over the last two years
WBES
Obstacles Firm’s assessment of growth obstacle induced by an inadequately educated workforce
(ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4)
WBES
aWBES : World Bank Enterprises Surveys ; b GFDD : Global Financial Development Database ; c WDI : World
Development Indicators d DB : Doing Business ; e WGI : World Governance Indicators
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Table 8 – Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Independent variables
Credit 28952 0.6813 0.4660 0 1
Need 28952 0.6300 0.4828 0 1
Apply 18238 0.5810 0.4934 0 1
Accepted 10598 0.8504 0.3567 0 1
Dependent variables
Firm-level variables
Firm size 28952 77.9750 237.524 0 5000
Age 28952 16.9504 14.9103 0 108
Experience 28952 17.2560 11.1765 0 75
Largest owner 28952 78.2017 26.7016 0 100
Foreign-owned 28952 0.1001 0.3001 0 1
Gov.-owned 28952 0.0057 0.0757 0 1
Exporter 28952 0.1390 0.3460 0 1
Subsidiary 28952 0.1286 0.3348 0 1
Audited 28952 0.4753 0.4993 0 1
Publicly listed 28952 0.0515 0.2211 0 1
Privately held 28952 0.5847 0.4928 0 1
Construction 28952 0.1606 0.3671 0 1
WK 28952 48.5730 39.9079 0 100
Obstacles 28952 1.5163 1.3590 0 4
Country-level variables
CR3 70 65.4999 19.1019 26.08 100
Lerner 51 0.2482 0.0691 0.12 0.44
Boone 69 -0.0900 0.2376 -1.59 0.54
H-stat 35 0.6500 0.2203 -0.02 0.99
Fin. Dev. 70 30.6170 23.0935 1.56 95.97
GDPpc 70 2647.21 2701.75 92.37 13836
Growth 70 5.7105 3.9012 -4.24 21.71
Inflation 70 10.4114 10.7748 -1.74 80.75
Legal rights 70 5.1285 2.3089 1 10
Credit Info 70 3.1745 2.1629 0 6
Institution Dev. 70 -0.2309 0.6217 -1.61 1.14
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th
e
ta
b
le
.
M
o
d
e
ls
[1
]-
[4
]
a
re
e
st
im
a
te
d
b
y
ru
n
n
in
g
ra
n
d
o
m
-e
ff
e
c
t
p
ro
b
it
m
o
d
e
l.
T
h
e
L
R
te
st
c
o
m
p
a
re
s
th
e
p
o
o
le
d
e
st
im
a
to
r
(p
ro
b
it
)
w
it
h
th
e
p
a
n
e
l
e
st
im
a
to
r.
U
n
d
e
r
n
u
ll
h
y
p
o
th
e
si
s,
th
e
p
a
n
e
l
e
st
im
a
to
r
is
n
o
t
d
iff
e
re
n
t
fr
o
m
th
e
p
o
o
le
d
e
st
im
a
to
r.
M
o
d
e
ls
[5
]-
[1
2
]
a
re
e
st
im
a
te
d
b
y
ru
n
n
in
g
p
o
o
le
d
P
S
S
m
o
d
e
l.
T
h
e
W
a
ld
te
st
c
o
m
p
a
re
s
th
e
p
o
o
le
d
e
st
im
a
to
r
(p
ro
b
it
)
w
it
h
th
e
P
S
S
m
o
d
e
l.
U
n
d
e
r
n
u
ll
h
y
p
o
th
e
si
s,
th
e
P
S
S
e
st
im
a
to
r
is
n
o
t
d
iff
e
re
n
t
fr
o
m
th
e
p
o
o
le
d
e
st
im
a
to
r.
A
ll
m
o
d
e
ls
in
c
lu
d
e
fi
rm
-
a
n
d
c
o
u
n
tr
y
-l
e
v
e
l
c
o
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ry
-d
u
m
m
ie
s.
M
E
s
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
,
a
n
d
z
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
re
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
a
d
ju
st
e
d
fo
r
c
lu
st
e
ri
n
g
a
t
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
-l
e
v
e
l.
† ,
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
a
n
d
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
1
5
%
,
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
.
